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I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper we address the following issues: whether and how
the UK has influenced EU competition policy, what EU competition
law and policy might have been without the UK’s membership, and
the consequences Brexit is likely to have on this policy field.
The main challenge in addressing the first set of questions is
methodological: what sources best show the influence of a given
Member State to the policies of the Union? What might be said to be
the distinctly British approach to a policy field like competition law?
Even answering these questions does not necessarily solve all
problems, for then one has to work out how British preferences get
transmitted in a complex decision-making process which is led by the
Commission as a policy entrepreneur, but often mediated via a range
of exchanges across a range of institutions.1 Thus, in Part IIa we start
by reviewing the methodological choices that were made to identify
how one might go about tracing British influence. A second
preliminary issue discussed in Part IIb is on how to identify what one
means by ‘Britishness’ in the context of competition law.
Assessments of British competition law before accession are at best
ambivalent about the overall institutional design and suggest that the
policy behind the various legislative efforts showed little coherence.2
As discussed in Part IV, it was the UK who copied the EU’s
competition regime in 1998, so it may be more fruitful to see how far
the UK’s implementation of the EU regime may both show some
specific British features and tell us something of what the UK may
have contributed to the EU since that time.
Having identified methods for studying the questions we assess
British influences in Part III by considering the role of two senior
British officials: Sir Leon Brittan and Francis Jacobs. Their work
suggests that there are certain features to the British approach to
competition law (focus on economic effects and a skepticism of state
intervention) that are distinct from those espoused by others. We then
* Professor of Competition Law, European University Institute. With thanks to Barry
Hawk, Fernanda Nicola and Heike Schweitzer for helpful comments. All errors remain mine.
1. For an example in the field of energy policy, see T. Maltby ‘European Union energy
policy integration: A case of European Commission policy entrepreneurship and increasing
supranationalism’ 55 Energy Policy 435 (2013).
2. See D.J. GERBER, LAW AND COMPETITION IN TWENTIETH CENTURY EUROPE 207-26
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). For a more critical assessment, see H. MERCER,
CONSTRUCTING A COMPETITIVE ORDER (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995).
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turn to the enforcement of competition law since 2000 and note a
similar tone when courts and public officials apply EU competition
law.
II. METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. Sources
It is well established that the introduction of the rules of
competition in the Treaty of Rome was the result of requests from the
United States with strong support from German scholars and
officials.3 However the umbilical cord with the US was cut early on
and EU competition law enforcement developed a distinctive
European flavor. The procedural rules established in Regulation 17/62
centralized power in the Commission, with little space for private
enforcement; 4 the substantive interpretation of the rules on
competition between the 1960s and the mid-1980s is often said to
have been ‘formalistic’ in the EU, while increasingly effects-based in
the United States. 5
The historical records have traced American and German
influence in the early years. 6 It is harder to pinpoint the precise
contribution that the UK has made to competition law and policy
since its entry into the common market in 1973, because there are few
sources that allow us to examine this. In other fields of EU Law,
where progress is made by the drafting of secondary legislation or
where certain national courts can determine the development of EU
law, it may be easier to determine the influence of a given Member
State. For example in a field closely related to competition policy, the
construction of the internal market, the influence of a British civil
3. W. WELLS, ANTITRUST AND THE FORMATION OF THE POSTWAR WORLD (New
York: Columbia University Press, 2002); K.K. PATEL & H. SCHWEITZER, THE HISTORICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF EU COMPETITION LAW (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
4. Council Regulation No. 17/62, 13J.O. 204 (1962), OJ. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1959-62,
at 87
5. For an early contribution in this regard, see B.E. Hawk, The American (antitrust)
revolution: lessons for the EEC?, 9 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 53 (1988).
6 . G. Marenco, The Birth of Modern Competition Law in Europe, in EUROPEAN
INTEGRATION AND INTERNATIONAL CO-ORDINATION: STUDIES IN HONOUR OF CLAUSDIETER EHLERMANN (A. von Bogdandy et al. eds., 2002) (reviewing the preparatory works);
L. VAN MIDDELAAR, THE PASSAGE TO EUROPE: HOW A CONTINENT BECAME A UNION 16061 (Yale University Press, 2013) (discussing Germany’s role in the first procedural
regulation).
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servant, Lord Cockfield, is undoubted. 7 Indeed after the Prime
Minister’s speech on 17 January 2017 some remarked that her wish to
exit the single market is striking because it is seen as a British
creation. 8 We would be hard pressed to find traces of any
jurisdiction’s influence in antitrust that are as marked as this, save
perhaps for the influence of Germany in the early years, which is
characterized by the role that a number of senior figures from
Germany played in the early days in the negotiations of the Treaty of
Rome and within the Commission.9
The important influence of German officials inspires the first
method deployed here: to look at the two key institutions responsible
for developing competition policy (the Commission and the Court)
and ask how far British members have played a decisive role in
shaping the field. Whether this method yields useful insights may be
questioned. The numbers of Commissioners and judges whose work
we can review is limited: there has been only one British competition
commissioner and the Court rules as a collegiate body so working out
the role of individual judges is invidious. We can identify the
approach of Advocates General but it is not always clear how much of
their approach is followed by the Court. Moreover focusing on
individuals ignores the work of more junior civil servants and
référendaires, who may be said to have an equally important role in
the background of policy making. Having said that, two figures stand
out whose contribution to the European Union project can hardly be
doubted and who have had an important impact on competition law:
the late Sir Leon Brittan (Commissioner for competition between
1989 and 1993) and Sir Francis Jacobs (Advocate General at the
Court of Justice of the European Union from 1988 to 2006). This is
not to say that other Advocates General from the UK have not had a
similar influence on competition law, but for present purposes we
7. Margaret Thatcher’s reminiscences on Lord Cockfield are worth recording: ‘I always
paid tribute to the contribution he made to the Single Market.’ But then she also went on to
note that as the project developed, ‘[i]t was too easy for him… to go native and to move from
deregulating the market to reregulating it under the rubric of harmonisation.’ MARGARET
THATCHER, THE DOWNING STREET YEARS 547 (London: Harper Collins Publishers, 1993);
see also D. Edward, The British Contribution to the Development of Law and Legal Process in
the European Union, in THE BRITISH CONTRIBUTION TO THE EUROPE OF THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 28-9 (B. Markesinis ed., 2002).
8. M. Emerson, Theresa May’s Brexit Speech of 17 January 2017 – Decoding its clarity
and ambiguity, CEPS Policy Insights No. 2017/01 (January 25 2017).
9. See A.C. WITT, THE MORE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO EU ANTITRUST LAW 85-6
(Bloomsbury/Hart, 2016) and the sources cited therein.
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focus on one member of the court.10 His background and length of
service combine to suggest that his Opinions are likely to have had
greater influence than Advocates General who lack these attributes.11
Second, we turn to British competition law. One might
reasonably think that this would be a useful starting point to trace
British influences, for it would allow one to determine what the
British understanding of competition law had been and to then try and
trace how far this understanding was shifted to Brussels or
Luxembourg. However, this exercise reveals something else: it is the
EU that influenced the UK, in particular since the Labour government
took office in 1997. Moreover, given the paucity of enforcement
action by the Office of Fair Trading (“OFT”) first and the
Competition and Markets Authority (“CMA”) now, it is also quite
hard to see what a particularly British view of competition law is all
about even today. At the same time, in judgments of the British courts
and in some enforcement activities of the OFT and CMA we can
detect what will be labeled as ‘critical deference’ to the approach to
competition law found in the EU institutions. This has never led to a
major fracture between the British and the EU approach, and only a
competition law specialist would notice the subtle differences
between the two systems. Yet, the themes that arise from these
divergences are aligned to the themes that emerge from the analysis
of the work of Brittan and Jacobs.
B. Britishness
In trying to ground the above materials around the theme of
Britishness, we can draw on two strands of debate about the role of
competition. The first is the widely discussed and often contested
10. One might also discuss David Edward. For instance, he was the reporting judge in
two of the major judgments that explore the concept of collective dominance. See Compagnie
Maritime Belge SA et al. v. Commission, Joined Cases C-395/96 P & C-396/96 P, [2000]
E.C.R. I-1442; Società Italiana Vetro SpA et al. v. Commission, Joined Cases T-68/89, T77/89, & T-78/89, [1992] E.C.R. II-1405; see also M. Clough, Collective Dominance: The
Contribution of the Community Courts, in TRUE EUROPEAN – ESSAYS FOR JUDGE DAVID
EDWARD (M. Hoskins & W. Robinson eds., 2003) (noting that these two were seminal
judgments, but that the focus has now shifted to exploring oligopolistic interdependence under
the merger rules, and there has been no appetite to explore the notion of abuse of collective
dominance under Article 102 since these two judgments).
11. See U. Šadl & S. Sankari, The elusive influence of the AG on the Court of Justice:
the case of European citizenship, YEARBOOK OF EUR. L. (forthcoming) whose research
suggests that Advocates General who are former academics and who are senior members of
the Court are more likely to be followed.
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divide in EU antitrust: between those who would like the system to
look more to the economic effects and those who take the view that
competition law safeguards the competitive process. It will be clear
from the findings below that the British have more sympathy for the
former, and this is evidenced by the positions taken by Brittan and Sir
Francis as well as by the approach taken by the OFT and the CMA
since 2000.12
The second debate that allows one to explore what might be the
distinctively British view rests on the different sort of capitalism
espoused in the UK as opposed to the continent.13 Transposing the
literature on varieties of capitalism into the antitrust context, we can
suggest that in a liberal market economy (like the UK) privatization
and efficiency are seen as the key benchmarks in testing the
performance of markets, and that this framework should extend to
public services. It is agreed that in the field of telecommunications for
example, it was the British who engaged in liberalization first and
offered a model for how to open the market to competition, even if it
is suggested that they did not offer leadership when the EU embarked
upon the long path to liberalization. 14 In contrast, the Continental
view considers that the state has a central role to play in delivering
public services, with little space for competition.15
Finally, one might examine how far British common law
methods filtered through as a result of British lawyers or judges.
However, we can leave this discussion to a more general discussion
on the Court of Justice of the European Union and identify only one
salient episode: the recognition of legal and professional privilege by

12. R. Nazzini, A Welfare—Based Competition Policy Under Structuralist Constraints:
Abuse of Dominance and OFT Practice, in TEN YEARS OF UK COMPETITION LAW REFORM
(B.J. Rodger ed., Dundee University Press 2010).
13. See generally VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM (Peter A. Hall & David Soskice eds.,
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
14. See EUROPEAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS LIBERALISATION 45 (Kjell A. Eliassen &
Marit Sjovaag eds., Routledge 1999).
15. For a general discussion of the UK versus the Continental approaches and the
management of the tension at EU level, see TONY PROSSER, THE LIMITS OF COMPETITION
LAW – MARKETS AND PUBLIC SERVICES (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2002). For a
French perspective, see C. Haguenau-Moizard, ‘Servizi di interesse generale e servizio
pubblico “alla francese”: dal confronto al ravvicinamento’ in E. FERRARI (ED.) ATTIVITÀ
ECONOMICHE ED ATTIVITÀ SOCIALI NEI SERVIZI DI INTERESSE GENERALE (E. Ferrari, Torino:
Giappichelli, 2007).
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the Court of Justice in AM&S.16 It is said that this principle emerged
as a result of British lawyers’ pleas and the Court was advised by the
first British AG (Jean-Pierre Warner); however this ruling has not
been universally welcomed because the Court held that advice from
independent lawyers was privileged but advice from in-house lawyers
was not. Moreover, the AG and Court did not extract this principle
solely from British law but drew, as is often the case, from the
traditions of all the Member States. Still on common law and on AG
Warner’s tenure, it has been noted that he led certain other
developments that come straight from a common law background: he
engaged lawyers in discussion at oral hearings and cited ‘precedent’
more frequently than other advocates general at the time. 17 These
influences on court procedure, while relevant for competition
litigation, are left outside the scope of this discussion.
III. BRITISH INFLUENCES ON EU COMPETITION LAW
A. Sir Francis Jacobs
Sir Francis Jacobs has been among the longest serving
Advocates General, rendering 588 opinions, of which 50 in
competition law cases.18 One commentator suggested that he was AG
in many of the leading competition law cases during his tenure.19 His
Opinions have a number of features that make them stand out: the
clear way his Opinions begin with a brief, clear explanation of the
issues at stake, his willingness to refer to foreign law, 20 and the

16. See AM & S Europe Ltd. v Commission, Case 155/79, [1982] E.C.R. 1575. See the
amusing account of the background in J. Lever ‘Foreword’ in M. HOSKINS & W. ROBINSON, A
TRUE EUROPEAN – ESSAYS FOR JUDGE DAVID EDWARD xii-xiii (Oxford: Hart Publishing
2004).
17. See NOREEN BURROWS & ROSA GREAVES, THE AG AND EC LAW 167-68 (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2007). The authors explore how far this AG impacted upon
competition law, and one of their principal findings is his interest in safeguarding the rights of
the defense. They see this as the result of his background. Unfortunately the authors did not
discuss the AM&S judgment.
18. I am grateful to U. Šadl for sharing her data on which these figures draw.
19. See Richard Whish, Competition Law, in MAKING COMMUNITY LAW: THE LEGACY
OF AG JACOBS AT THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE 118 (Philip Moser & Katrine Sawyer
eds., Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2008).
20. Writing extra-judicially, he noted how in the Oscar Bronner case (discussed below)
references to US antitrust were decisive. See Francis Jacobs, Judicial Dialogue and the CrossFertilization of Legal Systems: The European Court of Justice, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 547, 555
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systematic and clever handling of precedent.21 For present purposes,
we focus on two issues: first how his Opinions demonstrated a more
economics-based approach than the rest of the Court. This approach
coincided with the Commission’s move in the same direction, while
this has not yet influenced the Court completely. Second, we consider
the many instances where he wrote Opinions in disputes concerning
the relationship between competition law and the welfare state.
1. The More Economic Approach
Perhaps the most telling illustration that allows us to see the
difference in view concerns the assessment of GlaxoSmithKline’s
(“GSK”) conduct in Greece. In brief, the firm noted that its Greek
wholesalers were re-selling medicines that GSK shipped to Greece to
other markets: since prices for certain medicines are regulated in the
various Member States, and the prices in Greece are very low, Greek
wholesalers found it profitable to export the medicines. GSK took
steps to limit supplies to Greek wholesalers with a view to stopping
this conduct and the question arose if this constituted an abuse of a
dominant position in view of GSK’s dominance in the medicines in
question.
The procedural story evolved as follows. First, the matter was
taken up by the Greek Competition Commission. Unsure of certain
aspects of Article 102 Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union (“TFEU”), the Commission made a reference for a preliminary
ruling. AG Jacobs gave an Opinion but the Court dismissed the matter
on procedural grounds, holding that the Greek Commission could not
make a reference to the ECJ. Second, the matter then was the subject
of litigation between GSK and the wholesalers in Greece and the
Greek court made a second reference, when the ECJ finally gave an
answer on the law.22
(2003); see also Ministère Public v. Tournier, Case 395/87, [1989] E.C.R. 2565, for another
instance where US antitrust experience was referred to by AG Jacobs.
21 . At times perhaps too clever: in Ministère de l’Économie, des Finances et de
l’Industrie v. GEMO SA, he diagnosed two conflicting strands of case law and proposed a
hybrid test whereby both strands would apply to different facts. See Opinion of Advocate
General Jacobs, GEMO SA, Case C-126/01, [2002] E.C.R. I-13772. Ultimately the ECJ was
persuaded to adopt one approach and jettison the other in Altmark Trans GmbH &
Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg v. Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark GmbH, Case C-280/00,
[2003] E.C.R. I-7810.
22. The procedural history of this case is complicated: it reached the Court first by way
of a reference for a preliminary ruling from the Greek competition authority. See Syfait et al.
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The key difference between AG Jacobs and the ECJ hinges on
the grounds upon which a refusal to supply could be justified. Jacobs
took the view that three particular circumstances mattered: the
regulatory context, the importance of innovation, and the role of
wholesalers. He considered that these features militated in favor of
giving GSK a chance to justify its otherwise abusive conduct. First,
the regulatory context revealed that price differences among the
Member States were the result of national regulation, so this was not a
case where GSK was using its economic power to divide up the
internal market; second, certain legal/moral obligations meant that
GSK would not leave the Greek market without the required number
of medicinal products for the wholesalers to discharge their public
service obligations. Third, innovation is expensive and the higher
prices that GSK is able to sell its medicines at in some states provide
it with much needed revenue to develop new drugs – to avoid these
losses a firm like GSK might refuse to sell new drugs in states where
it foresees parallel imports, or it may negotiate higher prices in
Greece, thus damaging the (already precarious) finances of that
country and others who set low prices to buy medicines. Otherwise,
the firms might slow down the rate of innovation. Finally he reasoned
that given the market structure, it would only be wholesalers making
parallel trade who would benefit from the current practice: ‘it cannot
be assumed that parallel trade would in fact benefit either the ultimate
consumers of pharmaceutical products or the Member States, as
primary purchasers of such products.’23
The Court of Justice saw things differently, in two respects: first,
in certain parts of its judgment it considered that parallel trade could
benefit the final consumer because the conduct of the wholesalers
could result in some consumer benefits. Here the Court agreed with
AG Jacobs’ policy line and differed on its assessment of the
economics of the market. Second, the Court paid much less attention
to the innovation argument – it subsumed it into its case law which
v. GlaxoSmithKline plc & GlaxoSmithKline AEVE, Case C‑53/03, [2005] E.C.R. I-4638.
Here AG Jacobs rendered an Opinion but the Court held that the Greek competition authority
was not entitled to make a reference. The same dispute reached the Court again as a result of
litigation between GSK and Greek wholesalers. See Sot. Lelos kai Sia EE et al. v.
GlaxoSmithKline AEVE Farmakeftikon Proionton, Joined Cases C-468/06 to C-478/06,
[2008] E.C.R. I-7139. AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer was none too thrilled to write this after AG
Jacobs had already expressed his views in the earlier judgment. See Opinion of Advocate
General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, Sot. Lelos kai Sia EE, [2008] E.C.R. I-7144, ¶ 1.
23. See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Syfait, [2004] E.C.R. I-4611.
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provides that a dominant undertaking is entitled to reduce the
quantities it supplies to protect its commercial interests and that this
may be lawful if proportionate (e.g. it may be justified to refuse to sell
a wholesaler quantities that are significantly higher than it needs for
domestic supply and that are ‘essentially destined for parallel
export’ 24 ) The Court’s two moves are, however, contradictory: if
parallel trade offers the opportunity for consumer gains, then why
tolerate a reduction in such trade on the basis that GSK is entitled to
protect its commercial interests? If the public good protected by
competition law is the increase in gains for consumers, how can one
legitimately allow for a reduction in consumer welfare on the basis
that the firm wishes to protect its commercial interests? In contrast
AG Jacobs’ analytical stance balances competing welfare effects:
considering the impact of the practices in question on allocative and
dynamic efficiencies.
This tension is merely one of many illustrations of the
contradictions in the case law on abuse of dominance: unspecified
theories of harm and an unclear space for justifications. AG Jacobs’
approach instead sought to generate a degree of coherence, while
being very cautious. First, he indicated his dissatisfaction with the
abuse/objective justification dichotomy:
the very fact that conduct is characterized as an ‘abuse’
suggests that a negative conclusion has already been
reached, by contrast with the more neutral terminology of
‘prevention, restriction, or distortion of competition’ under
Article 81 EC. In my view, it is therefore more accurate to
say that certain types of conduct on the part of a dominant
undertaking do not fall within the category of abuse at all.25

The background to this statement has to do with the perception
that, to paraphrase Justice Potter Stewart, the sole consistency in
Article 102 cases is that the Commission always wins.26 In practical
terms, the semantic twist he proposes is less relevant than the implicit
call for a more careful effects-based analysis of restrictive practices.
24. Sot. Lelos kai Sia EE, [2008] E.C.R. I-7139, ¶ 71.
25. Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Syfait, [2004] E.C.R. I-4611, ¶ 72.
26. United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966). Nearly always: The
Court annulled abuse decisions in Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can
Company Inc. v. Commission, Case 6-72, ECLI:EU:C:1973:22 and Hugin Kassregister v.
Commission, Case 22/78, ECLI:EU:C:1979:138. There have also been some partial
annulments, for example United Brands Company v. Commission, Case 27/76,
ECLI:EU:C:1978:22.
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Moreover, the Opinion tries to explore how to craft an efficiency
defense to justify the conduct of dominant firms. He is cautious to
state that there are very specific facts in this case that justify the
approach he suggests, but his analysis incorporates elements that can
allow a decision maker to balance the welfare gains and losses from
the conduct of the dominant firm. This approach was later followed
by the ECJ.27
In subsequent litigation on the same set of facts (but this time
concerning Spanish parallel traders) we can observe a further
development. In an appeal against a Commission decision finding that
GSK had infringed Article 101 by agreements banning parallel trade
the General Court considered that the appropriate test for legality is
whether the conduct harms consumers. This appears to have been
inspired by the approach AG Jacobs took. However, on appeal the
Court of Justice held that this was an error of law. The true role of
competition law was described as follows by the higher court:
There is nothing in [Article 101 TFEU] to indicate that only
those agreements which deprive consumers of certain advantages
may have an anti-competitive object. Secondly, it must be borne
in mind that the Court has held that, like other competition rules
laid down in the Treaty, Article [101 TFEU] aims to protect not
only the interests of competitors or of consumers, but also the
structure of the market and, in so doing, competition as such.28

This disagreement encapsulates very clearly the two visions for
antitrust: the General Court’s approach is much more in line with the
more economics-based analysis of restrictive practices, while the
Court of Justice continues to find a wider set of interests that
competition law protects.
If we remain with refusals to deal, we can continue to find
evidence of this clash between the two approaches by reviewing one
of AG Jacobs’ most highly regarded Opinions: that in Oscar
Bronner.29 This was a dispute between the owner of a newspaper who
also operated an efficient distribution network and a rival newspaper
27. British Airways v. Commission, Case C-95/04 P, [2007] E.C.R. I-2373, ¶ 86.
28. GlaxoSmithKline Unlimited et al. v. Commission, Joined Cases C-501/06 P, C513/06 P, C-515/06 P, & C-519/06 P, 2009, ¶ 63, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A62006CJ0501.
29. Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v. Mediaprint Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverlag
GmbH & Co. KG, Case C-7/97, [1998] E.C.R. I-7817. It has been noted that many discussions
of the case refer to the Opinion as if it were the judgment. See Whish, supra note 19, at 120.
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who wanted to have access to the distribution network. Here too we
can detect a small but significant difference between the approach he
recommended and the one the Court followed. Before this judgment it
was not clear what was required to show that a refusal to deal was an
abuse and the question came up whether an ‘essential facilities’
doctrine should be crafted. AG Jacobs suggested a more restrictive
and piecemeal approach. Rather than suggesting a formula, he pointed
to a number of policy considerations that should be taken into
account. First he noted that freedom of contract and property rights
militated against an expansive application of competition law. Then
he noted that the welfare effects of imposing an obligation to deal
were relevant: in the short run consumers might gain but in the long
run access rights might reduce incentives to innovate. Finally, he
suggested that attention should be paid to the competitive conditions
on the downstream market: if the downstream market is competitive,
then an obligation to deal would not safeguard the interest of
consumers, but only those of competitors.30
The Court of Justice agreed with its AG that on the facts there
was likely no abuse (because it was not impossible to duplicate the
distribution network of the dominant firm).31 But it took a different
line on the criteria to determine when a refusal to supply would be
considered an abuse: at the very minimum the Court suggested that
the refusal should be ‘likely to eliminate all competition in the daily
newspaper market on the part of the person requesting the service and
that such refusal be incapable of being objectively justified.’32 It also
considered that the service should be indispensable.
The key difference is subtle but significant: for AG Jacobs one
has to show that there is harm on the downstream market, for the
Court it suffices that the rival has no other means of accessing the
downstream market. In most cases this makes no difference, but AG
Jacobs would allow a defendant to justify a refusal to deal on the
basis that the downstream market is workably competitive – the Court
would not entertain this line of argument.

30. Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG, [1998] E.C.R. I-7817, ¶ 54-62.
31. It is of course unusual that the Court effectively ruled on the facts when it was
merely asked for assistance in interpreting a question of law.
32. Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG, [1998] E.C.R. I-7817, ¶ 41.
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It was AG Jacobs’ approach that found its way into the
Commission’s Guidance Paper on Article 102.33 This document was
an attempt by the Commission to modernize its interpretation of the
rules on exclusionary conduct along an approach that focused more
attentively on the likely effect of conduct, and in the years leading up
to this document, Francis Jacobs was probably the main proponent of
a similar vision within the Court.34
2. The Welfare State and Competition Law
Another line of jurisprudence where AG Jacobs had a role to
play is in the interface between competition law and the delivery of
public services. Here the matter litigated is how far competition law
should apply to the activities of providers of public services (in
technical terms, whether these providers should be considered to be
‘undertakings’ for the purposes of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU), and if
competition law applies to them, whether the fact that they must
deliver such services affords them an exemption, on the basis that
they provide services of general interest on the basis of Article 106(2)
TFEU. One of AG Jacobs’ lines serves well to encapsulate his
position to these legal questions: ‘the objective of Article [106(2)
TFEU]… is the efficient provision of services of general economic
interest.’35 In other words, it does not matter whether competition law
applies or whether the firm is entitled to hold a monopoly on the
provision of a service: either the market or the regulatory framework
must ensure that the supplier acts efficiently. This is a far cry from the
views of those who believe that the disapplication of competition law
means that the provider of public services had the right to be left
alone.36

33. See Communication from the Commission – Guidance on the Commission’s
Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary
Conduct by Dominant Undertakings, 2009 O.J. C 45/7, ¶¶ 81-90 (focusing on the harm to
competition on the downstream market but not on any abstract consideration of harm to
competition as such).
34. See generally Giorgio Monti, Article 82 EC: What Future for the Effects-Based
Approach?, 1 J. OF EUR. COMPETITION L. & PRAC. 2 (2010).
35. Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Ambulanz Glöckner v. Landkreis
Südwestpfalz, Case C-475/99, [2001] E.C.R. I-8094, ¶ 188.
36. Perhaps nicely illustrated by Italy v. Commission, Case 41/83, [1985] E.C.R. 880,
¶¶ 13, 14, where Italy appealed against a decision against British Telecom on the basis that this
was a public authority and so immune from the application of competition law. The UK
intervened instead to support the Commission’s decision. Id.
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Under EU Law there are two techniques by which providers of
social welfare services can argue that competition law should not
apply: they can claim that they are not undertakings, so that Articles
101 and 102 are inapplicable, or they can claim that Article 106(2)
applies to their conduct so that the competition rules should not apply
if they would hamper the delivery of a service of general economic
interest. AG Jacobs was involved in disputes concerning both lines of
argument.
As to the first, the Court generally followed his advice but there
was a disagreement in AOK Bundesverband that can be used to
illustrate the differences that a more market-oriented analysis can
make. The dispute arose when it was discovered that the German
sickness insurance funds agreed among themselves the maximum
amounts they would pay for certain medicines. Was this an agreement
under Article 101, or were the sickness funds not to be characterized
as undertakings? The Court held that the sickness funds, which
covered 90 per cent of the German population and which had an
obligation to offer the same benefits to each person, were not to be
treated as undertakings because of the exclusively social objective
that they pursued. In agreeing the maximum amount of
reimbursement they merely continued to pursue this objective under
statutory guidance. 37 On the contrary AG Jacobs placed more
emphasis on the findings that the various sickness insurance funds did
have some space for competition among each other and that as a
result, without the agreement they would also have been able to
compete on the level of reimbursement offered to their clients.38 In his
view then, the test for legality would hinge upon whether the
agreement to restrict price competition could be justified under
Article 106(2) TFEU as a restriction of competition necessary to
allow the undertakings to deliver a service of general economic
interest.
Turning to Article 106(2) TFEU, commentators agreed that the
Court has become increasingly lax in allowing Member States to
plead this defense but critical as to the precise standard that the Court

37. AOK Bundesverband et al. v. Ichthyol-Gesellschaft Cordes, Hermani & Co et al.,
Joined Cases C-264/01, C-306/01, C-354/01, and C-355/01, [2004] E.C.R. I-2524, ¶¶ 61-63.
Query if the better analysis of this point was to rely on the state compulsion defense – that is to
say: national law required or encouraged the agreements.
38. Id; Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Syfait, [2005] E.C.R. I-4638, ¶¶ 38-43.
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applies.39 In parallel to this development, AG Jacobs appears to have
requested that the Court add a condition to any decision finding that a
restriction of competition could be tolerated on the basis that it is
necessary to provide the service of general interest: in a judgment
concerning the assignment of monopoly rights over the provision of
ambulance services, he indicated that it was essential that the provider
of the service of general interest be in a position to provide the service
effectively. This proviso reflects his earlier understanding of the case
law on the application of Articles 106(1) and 102 where he indicated
that one strand of the case law shows that a state infringes these
provisions when they grant a monopoly to a provider who is
manifestly incapable of delivering the service in question.40
In sum: competition and efficiency are benchmarks by which
public service delivery is monitored, according to his Opinions. The
Court has not always followed this approach, in that its case law tries
to also accommodate the view of those who support greater market
intervention in the name of social justice.41
B. Sir Leon Brittan
Sir Leon Brittan described his stint in Brussels in the following
terms: ‘I like to think that my work in bulldozing through reforms
which levered open markets, intensified competition and put public
sector monopolists on the back foot contributed to changing the terms
of the debate.’42 This self-assessment helps us to take into account his
role in one of the more significant competition law reforms to which
his name is associated: the EU Merger Regulation.43
The EU Treaties do not regulate mergers: the Commission
proposed a Regulation to address these transactions in 1973 but it was
39.
M.G. Ross, The Europeanization of Public Service Provision: Harnessing
Competition and Citizenship?, 23 YEARBOOK OF EUR. L. 303, 310-11 (2004).
40.
An example of his classification of the case law can be found in Albany
International BV v. Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie. See Opinion of Advocate
General Jacobs, Albany International BV v. Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie,
Case C-67/96, [1999] E.C.R. I-5754.
41 .
D. CHALMERS, G. DAVIES. & G. MONTI EUROPEAN UNION LAW: TEXT AND
MATERIALS Ch.25 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 3rd ed. 2014) (available
exclusively as an online chapter).
42. L. BRITTAN, A DIET OF BRUSSELS – THE CHANGING FACE OF EUROPE 49-50
(London: Little, Brown & Co, 2000).
43 . For a detailed personal account, see L. BRITTAN, COMPETITION POLICY AND
MERGER CONTROL IN THE SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET (Cambridge, Grotius, 1991).
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only in 1989 that a Regulation was agreed. 44 Brittan identified the
main stumbling block: certain Member States wished to retain
competence over mergers because they saw this power as a way of
exercising national policies (e.g. industrial, regional or social policies
could be implemented by allowing or blocking certain transactions).
Others were convinced that having a single merger regulator for the
EU would be preferable as a way of facilitating cross-border
acquisitions. The way this divide was managed is twofold: first the
scope of application of the Regulation was reduced (so that only very
large mergers would fall within the scope of Commission scrutiny)
and the substantive test by which to assess mergers was left
ambiguous, so the battle as to whether one should control mergers
only when they had a negative impact on welfare or whether other
public interest considerations could play a role was left for another
day, when the regulation would have to be applied.45
The confrontation happened in the well-known de Havilland
merger.46 In brief, two state owned companies (French Aerospatiale
and Italy’s Alenia) wished to buy a Canadian firm, de Havilland.
Together they would have held a dominant position in the market for
mid-sized aircraft but supporters of the merger saw this as an
occasion to create a European Champion. There was considerable
political jostling to secure sufficient votes at the Commission to block
the transaction, where Brittan played a major role to convince
undecided Commissioners.47 This was said to have solved the debate
in favour of an economics-based welfare standard. Since then,
according to Brittan the Commission’s merger decisions have focused
on ‘pure competition considerations.’48 This is not to say that at times
mergers might be cleared for political reasons that may have to do
with domestic policies or EU industrial policies, but it is hard to
detect more than a handful of instances where this might have
occurred. For example, in recent years the consolidation of the
44. See generally M. ARMSTRONG & S. BULMER, THE GOVERNANCE OF THE SINGLE
EUROPEAN MARKET Ch.4 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998).
45. The final text is Council Regulation (ECC) No. 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on
the Control of Concentrations between Undertakings, 1989 O.J. L 257/13.
46. Commission Decision No. 91/619/EEC (Aerospatiale-Alenia/de Havilland), 1991
O.J. L 334/42.
47. For an engaging account, see G. ROSS JACQUES DELORS AND EUROPEAN
INTEGRATION 178 (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1994).
48. See Brittan, supra note 42. For a slightly different assessment, see G. MONTI, EC
COMPETITION LAW 6-12 (2007).
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telecoms market was accompanied by significant lobbying by the
large players, and one might wonder how effective this has been.49
When examining Britain’s contribution we should distinguish
two aspects: first did he make the Regulation happen? Here he had a
good dose of other circumstances that made agreement possible: a
huge increase in merger activity in the run up to the finalization of the
single market, meaning that industry supported the initiative strongly,
and a significant judgment from the Court of Justice indicating that
certain mergers might be regulated under Article 101. 50 This case
would have given the Commission powers to vet mergers on the basis
of Regulation 17/62 and thus Member States were keen to negotiate a
solution that would allow them to have some influence in the outcome
of EU-wide merger control rules. Second, how far was the
competition-focus of the test for mergers due to Brittan’s influence?
A review of the negotiations by Hubert Buch-Hansen suggests that
there were other actors who also supported this, largely due to the
convergence towards what he calls a neo-liberal agenda for EU
integration.51 Form his perspective Brittan was not then ‘bulldozing’
market-based reforms but was bringing together a range of views
about how the economy should be run that were aligned with the
perspective of liberal market economies, which had by then managed
to secure pre-eminence.
We can perhaps generalize from this example: it seems clear that
for most EU level reforms one Member State can hardly ever claim to
do more than inspire a general direction, but that a partnership among
EU institutions and Member States is essential to yield a tangible
result.52 Nevertheless, it seems that Brittan’s push (both in getting the
Regulation through, and in persuading a slim majority of
Commissioners to block the de Havilland merger) was essential.
49. T. Barber, Lines are crossed on benefits of telecom consolidation, FINANCIAL
TIMES (27 Apr. 2016).
50. See generally British American Tobacco Co. Ltd et al. v. Commission et al., Joined
Cases 142/84 & 156/84, [1987] E.C.R. 4566.
51. See generally H. Buch-Hansen, Rethinking the History of European Level Merger
Control: A Critical Political Economy Perspective (Aug. 2008), available at:
http://openarchive.cbs.dk/bitstream/handle/10398/7729/hubert_buch-hansen.pdf.
52. See, for example Mark Thatcher who has shown that the liberalization of the
telecommunications sector was the result of a partnership among a range of EU and national
actors and was not the result of the Commission single-handedly acting as a policy
entrepreneur. Mark Thatcher, The Commission and National Governments as Partners: EC
Regulatory Expansion in Telecommunications 1979-2000, 8 J. OF EUR. PUB. POL’Y 558
(2001).
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C. British Competition Law
It is probably safe to say that before the enactment of the
Competition Act 1998, the UK’s own competition rules made little
impression in mainland Europe. Here is Sir Francis Jacobs’ pithy
assessment: ‘[t]he effectiveness of EC competition policy can be
contrasted with earlier UK approaches. The UK’s system was
formalistic, toothless and out of keeping with the newer economic
thinking, in the United Kingdom as well as in Europe.’53 Indeed, the
interesting story from the perspective of the ongoing Brexit
discussion is the voluntary import of EU competition law by the UK,
to which we now turn.
There had been a number of attempts to amend UK competition
law to bring it into line with the rules applied by the EU, not least
because this would make life easier for firms whose conduct would be
tested under both EU and UK rules. However successive
Conservative governments hesitated – according to some scholars this
was purely based on a concern about what voters might say to the UK
borrowing EU rules.54 It took until Blair’s New Labour government
for the Competition Act 1998 to emerge: this statute aligns UK
antitrust to Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. Moreover, section 60
provides for a convergence rule by which EU Law is a source of law
to interpret UK antitrust. Finally, the Competition Appeals Tribunal
(the first instance court where appeals against decisions of the OFT
are taken) is modeled on the Court of First Instance. Its first President
described it as a ‘unique example of “soft harmonization” in the area
of European procedural law.’55 At the level of institutions and statutes
certain differences remain: for instance the rules on mergers, amended
with the Enterprise Act 2002 are not inspired by EU Law, nor are the
powers to conduct market investigations.
It is not clear how far any steps the OFT took since the coming
into force of the Competition Act 1998 has had any influence on the
EU. First, the OFT has not been a particularly assiduous enforcer of
competition law; second no British judge has ever issued a request for
a preliminary ruling on a matter related to substantive competition
53. Francis Jacobs, The Sovereignty of Law: The European Way, 110 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2006).
54. Sebastian Eyre & Martin Lodge, National Tunes and a European Melody?
Competition Law Reform in the UK and Germany, 7 J. OF EUR. PUB. POL’Y 63 (2007).
55. Christopher Bellamy, Some Reflections on Procedure in Competition Cases, 34 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 15.
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law emanating from a decision of the OFT/CMA. The one time a
reference was made was in Courage v Crehan which, according to the
dominant view in the literature, is a vital judgment that establishes an
EU-based right to damages for competition law infringements. 56
However, the aftermath of this specific reference did not have a happy
ending for the plaintiff.57
However, the approach by the OFT and the British courts
suggests a distinctive British approach to antitrust. One must not
exaggerate: most jurisdictions in developed states apply broadly
similar principles – what I seek to show here are some nuances that in
my view demonstrate something particularly British, clustered around
the following: enforcement styles and the use of economics by the
OFT and informed divergence by the national courts.
1. Enforcement styles and economics by the OFT
The OFT has issued few decisions in the field of antitrust. The
Public Accounts Committee nudged the OFT politely in 2006 urging
it to take more cases,58 but the report of the Department for Business,
Innovation and Skills in March 2012 was less subtle: ‘The
Government remains concerned that too few cases are taken
forward.… relatively few decisions will lead to less deterrence and a
diluted economic impact than one in which more cases could be
run.’59 It is thus ironic to note that in the run-up to Brexit the OFT
(now renamed the Competition and Markets Authority) began to
increase its enforcement efforts.60
There are two possible explanations for the lack of enforcement.
One is encapsulated in the position taken by the OFT’s former Chief
56. Courage v. Crehan, Case C-453/99, [2001] E.C.R. I-6314.
57. He lost after the House of Lords ruled that in determining the facts the national court
was not bound by Commission decisions analyzing the same market but which were not
addressing the conduct of the firm being sued by Mr Crehan. Inntrepreneur Pub Co (CPC) and
others v. Crehan, [2006] UKHL 38. For a critical assessment, see Colleen Hanley, The
Abandonment of Deference, 44 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 817 (2007). The approach has been
applied again recently in Asda Stores Ld & Ors v. Mastercard Incorporated & Ors [2017]
EWHC 93 (Comm).
58. “The OFT is an organisation in transition, which has yet to demonstrate that it can
make effective use of the substantial extra resources it has been given.” House of Commons
Committee of Public Accounts, Enforcing Competition In Markets (2006).
59. Department for Business Innovation and Skills, Growth, Competition and the
Competition Regime: Government Response to Consultation (Mar. 2012) (6.17).
60. Catherine Belton, UK’s Competition Watchdog Sharpens its Teeth Ahead of Brexit,
FIN. TIMES (Jan. 3, 2017).
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Executive that there are other enforcement techniques than
prosecution, and that the ‘fetish around numbers of cases and high
fines’ 61 is unwarranted. Instead, the British competition authority
spends a number of resources in providing guidance to business to
secure their compliance. This also happens in the aftermath of certain
infringement decisions, where the agency explains to the industry
how to ensure their conduct moving forward can comply with
competition law. The resources devoted to this enforcement style take
away from the authority’s capacity to take more cases. A recent
example of this found in a decision against a supplier’s distribution
agreement where in the aftermath of the decision the CMA also sent
an open letter to suppliers clarifying the competition rules as well as
other guidance documents for businesses to understand the role
competition law plays in shaping distribution agreements.62
A second reason for the lack of productivity is that the OFT tries
to finesse the application of competition law. Its approach to resale
price maintenance (“RPM”) provides a good instance of this. While
agreements containing RPM clauses are deemed to be hardcore
restraints by the Commission, and so any competition authority would
find prosecution very easy, the officers of the OFT prefer a different
approach. In a paper published in 2011 some OFT officials explained
a preference for screening RPM cases to identify whether there was a
credible theory of harm. 63 The prioritization screens were then
implemented in deciding which RPM cases to select. 64 It is also
notable that some of these decisions were quite lengthy and set out a
number of fairly basic antitrust points, almost as if the OFT was
trying to educate the parties. One wonders if this is a means of trying
to secure better compliance.65 It has also been shown that the OFT has
61 . Speech, John Fingleton Competition and Growth in Europe (Oct. 10 2014),
http://www.fingletonassociates.com/speeches/competition-growth-europe/.
62. Competition and Markets Authority, Bathroom Fittings Sector: Investigation Into
Anti-Competitive Practices (May 17 2016), available at: https://www.gov.uk/cmacases/bathroom-fittings-sector-investigation-into-anti-competitive-practices.
63. Matthew Bennet et al, Resale Price Maintenance: Explaining the Controversy, and
Small Steps Towards a More Nuanced Policy, 33 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1278, 1297-98 (2011)
64. Unfortunately, the document attesting to their implementation has vanished from
the web, but a reference may be found in a slide deck on file with the author. For an example
of a decision where several filters were examined before proceeding against an RPM
agreement see its decision in the market for mobility aids, see https://www.gov.uk/cmacases/investigation-into-agreements-in-the-mobility-aids-sector.
65. For discussion of this point, see Mathew O’Regan, United Kingdom: Pride before a
fall in online advertising restrictions or getting away with illegal behavior that harms
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applied a more economics-based approach in its abuse of dominance
case law.66 This requires more resources and accounts for the relative
paucity of cases and may account for the lower numbers.
2. Informed Divergence by the Courts
It is perhaps worth starting this discussion with reference to an
Opinion by AG Jacobs where he advised national courts to avoid
making too many references for a preliminary ruling to the Court.67
This message has then been internalized by the British judiciary – and
in the context of antitrust one of the arguments against making a
reference to the Court is that frequently the difficulty in these cases
hinge not on understanding the law, but on applying settled principles
to new facts.68 This allows the British courts to be innovative in the
interpretation of EU competition law.69 One example of this relates to
vertical restraints where the anticompetitive effects are the result of
the existence of a range of contracts similar to the one at hand, and
where an agreement that was originally lawful becomes unlawful
once further such agreements are entered into. The English Court of
Appeal thus indicated that agreements may shift in and out of legality
as the market conditions alter.70 The ECJ had never explained whether
this was the correct way of interpreting Article 101(2) but the courts
in England preferred to settle this on their own.
A more recent instance where one can see critical deference is
found in Streetmap v Google. Here the claimant argued that Google
vulnerable
consumers?,
KLUWER
COMPETITION
BLOG
(Nov.
18,
2014),
http://kluwercompetitionlawblog.com/2014/11/18/united-kingdom-pride-before-a-fall-inonline-advertising-restrictions-or-getting-away-with-illegal-behaviour-that-harms-vulnerableconsumers/.
66. R. NAZZINI, A Welfare-Based Competition Policy Under Structuralist Constraints:
Abuse of Dominance and OFT Practice, in TEN YEARS OF UK COMPETITION LAW REFORM
(B. Rodger ed., 2010).
67 . Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Wiener S. I. GmbH v. Hauptzollamt
Emmerich, C-338/95, [1997] E.C.R. I-6497. For discussion, see M. Hoskins, Discretionary
References: To Refer or Not to Defer?, in TRUE EUROPEAN – ESSAYS FOR JUDGE DAVID
EDWARD (M. Hoskins & W. Robinson eds., 2003).
68. Professional Contractors’ Group v. Inland Revenue [2001] EWCA Civ 1945, [91].
69. And at times even critical of the approach of the European Courts, for example The
Racecourse Association and others v. Office of Fair Trading finding it hard to reconcile
certain judgments, but then interpreting the law itself rather than making a reference for a
preliminary ruling. [2005] CAT 29, [167].
70. Passmore v. Morland plc [1999] 3 All ER 1005. For discussion, see G. Monti, EU
Competition Law, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO EUROPEAN UNION PRIVATE LAW 2923 (C. Twigg-Flesner ed., 2010).
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had abused its dominant position in the search market to exclude
Streetmap from a downstream market where both competed to offer
useful maps for users, by promoting Google’s maps more effectively
that the claimant’s services. At first blush the judge had no objection
to this allegation, since leveraging one’s dominant position from an
upstream market to a downstream one is a common feature of many
abuse of dominance cases.71
However, Roth looked closely at the key ingredients of the
concept of abuse. In particular, the judge confronted the question of
the kind of effect that had to be shown. On this point the ECJ had
only recently spoken in Post Danmark II. There it held that there was
no appreciability threshold for the prohibition to apply, largely
because the dominant undertaking was already harming competition
by its presence that any further weakening could not be tolerated.72
Roth J held that this approach was fine when the dominant position
and the abuse both occurred in the same product and geographical
market: for instance on the facts of Post Danmark 2 when the former
state monopolist is alleged to have granted loyalty rebates to
customers, and forcing a new entrant from a newly opened market. In
these scenarios an aggressive application of Article 102 can
complement the liberalization of the postal services sector. However,
he held that when the abuse was taking place in a downstream market
that was not dominated by anyone, this approach could not stand. In
his view a de minimis threshold is necessary when the abuse is taking
place in a downstream, non-dominated market, especially when
Google’s conduct on the market where it is dominant was not
questioned: it would be ‘perverse’ to find that it abuses its dominance
in the downstream market without there being an appreciable
weakening of competition in that market.73 He felt that the case law
from the CJEU did not prevent this conclusion since it could be
distinguished on the facts.74
In this case the judge appears to treat the judgments of the Court
of Justice in the way a common law judge might treat judgments from
the same court: persuasive but not binding. Some might legitimately
question if this is the kind of deference one should show to the
71. Streetmap.EU Ltd. v. Google Inc. [2016] EWHC 253 (CH).
72. Post Danmark A/S v. Konkurrencerådet, Case C-23/14, 2015, ¶ 70-74, http://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A62014CJ0023.
73. Id. at ¶ 98.
74. Id. at ¶ 97.
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superior court. On the merits, however, the approach taken makes
eminent sense.
Summing up, it appears that within the EU British officials
helped to guide two developments: an effects-based analysis of
competitive restraints and a preference for competitive markets even
in the provision of public services. As regards the effects-based
approach the OFT/CMA’s practice suggests that its approach is even
more focused on abandoning formalist approaches to competition
law: its stance on resale price maintenance is a good illustration of
how the harsh rule under EU Law, whereby RPM agreements are said
to be restrictive by object, is tempered by setting up a range of filters
to determine which RPM cases to prioritize. This investment in prescreening is a contributing factor to its lower productivity. We find
similar critical deference in the way the British courts handle EU
precedents, which may suggest that there are national variations in the
way EU law is applied. 75 This last point suggests that the
straitjacketing effects of EU law may be less rigid than some Brexit
supporters might think, and that judicial conversations cold give a
role for national courts to inform the development of EU competition
law.76
IV. AFTER BREXIT
In this section, we speculate on what might happen after the UK
withdraws from the EU. At the time of writing there is much
uncertainty about the specific relationship that will be forged. In what
follows we assume that the British will not join the European
Economic Area and speculate on what impact this so-called ‘hard
Brexit’ (by which we assume that the UK exits from the internal
market) might entail for the two sides.
A. Post-Brexit EU
What have the British done for EU competition law? What might
be lost? A distinguished expert suggested that ‘the UK made major
contributions to the debate about the reform of the EU Merger
75. For an overview of differences in the field of abuse of dominance, see P.L. Parcu,
G. Monti & M. Botta (eds) ABUSE OF DOMINANCE IN EU COMPETITION LAW – EMERGING
TRENDS (P.L. Parcu, G. Monti & M. Botta eds., Edward Elgar 2017).
76. These conversations are better established in other fields of EU Law, see generally
Chalmers, supra note 41, at 222-29.
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Regulation in the early years of the 2000s and again to the complex
issue of the “reform” of Article 102 TFEU later in that decade.’77 The
reform of the merger regulation was a very technical affair, which can
be explained briefly in this way: originally the EU merger Regulation
allowed intervention only if the merger strengthened of created a
dominant position, when this was likely to substantially impede
effective competition. In contrast the UK’s Enterprise Act 2002 (and
the US provisions) allows intervention where there is a risk that the
merger may substantially lessen competition. The basic difference is
that the latter is more in line with the way economists review a
merger, focusing on the impact of a transaction and not on the
competitive structure of the market post-merger. In 2004 the Merger
Regulation was redrafted so that the substantive test is aligned to the
standards in the UK and US.78 The reform of Article 102 is an attempt
by the Directorate General for Competition to depart from the highly
criticized approach that it took (and the Court has sanctioned) and
develop tests for illegality grounded on mainstream economics. 79
Thus the ideas underpinning these moves by the Commission have the
same inspiration as those that we have seen informed the approach of
Brittan and Jacobs.
However, the claim that the UK had a hand in these two
developments might overplay British influence. It was an Italian
Commissioner (Mario Monti) who pressed for both: his training as an
economist probably made him sympathetic to the use of a more
economics-based approach.80 Moreover, if one reviews the literature
it appears that the advocates for reform are a cosmopolitan set of
practicing lawyers, economists and scholars. Even the Merger Task
Force, which was instituted to specialize in mergers, contained a
number of scholars from a diverse range of national traditions who

77. R. Whish, Brexit and EU Competition Policy, 7 J. OF EUR. COMPETITION L. &
PRAC. 297 (2016).
78. For discussion, see A. Oldale & J. Padilla, EU Merger Assessment of Upward
Pricing Pressure: Making Sense of UPP, GUPPI, and the Like, 4 J. OF EUR. COMPETITION, L.
& PRAC. 375 (2013).
79. See generally M. Marquis & E. Rousseva, Hell Freezes Over: A Climate Change
for Assessing Exclusionary Conduct under Article 102 TFEU, 4 J. OF EUR,. COMPETITION L.
AND PRAC. 32 (2013).
80. N. Levy, Mario Monti’s Legacy in EC Merger Control, 1 COMPETITION POL’Y
INT’L 99 (2005).
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readily embraced the more economics-based approach. 81 Thus it is
hard to see documentary evidence of the major contribution Richard
Whish says the UK has made in the twenty-first century.82
On the contrary, the discussion in Part III suggests that once
Lord Brittan left the Commission, the move towards a greater
economics-based analysis of competition law was fixed. Since then
one could rely on a much wider constituency of EU officials who are
committed to taking the modern approach to antitrust forward. None
of the Commissioners that have succeeded Brittan have altered the
direction of competition policy. Karel van Miert, a socialist, might
have been expected to revert to a more dirigiste style, but barring a
few decisions he kept the course maintained by Brittan; 83 Mario
Monti accelerated the development of a more economic approach;84
Neelie Kroes kept insisting on the importance of competitive markets
even during the deep recession that started in 2007, 85 Joaquim
Almunia and the present incumbent Margarethe Vestager have not
changed course either.86
The Court remains a more difficult entity to understand, which
may suggest the judges are divided on the application of competition
law. The judges were at one in rejecting the supposed demotion of
competition law in the Lisbon Treaty but have steered an ambiguous
81. The Merger Task Force was slowly disbanded starting in 2003, in the aftermath of
significant defeats of Commission decisions at the hand of the General Court. See N. Levy EU
Merger Control: From Birth to Adolescence, 26(2) WORLD COMPETITION 195 (2003).
82. It is fair to say that senior OFT members contributed in conferences debating the
reform of the merger regulation and that German officials seemed opposed to the reform. See
for example: J. Vickers, How to Reform the EC Merger Test?, in RC MERGER CONTROL: A
MAJOR REFORM PROCESS (G. Drauz & M. Reynolds eds. Richmond, IBA, 2003); J. Fingleton
& D. Nolan, Mind the gap. La riforma del regolamento comunitario sulle concentrazioni, 2
MERCATO CONCORRENZA REGOLE 209 (2003). At any rate, some have argued that the reform
of the Regulation ‘has had little if any impact on the outcome of merger decisions since 2004.’
S. BISHOP & M. WALKER, THE ECONOMICS OF EC COMPETITION LAW 360 (3rd ed. 2010). This
is also confirmed by other studies, for instance T. Reeves & F. Dethmers, EU Merger Control
Since the Introduction of the 2004 Reforms, 2013 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 153 (B. Hawk ed.
2014).
83. K. VAN MIERT, LE MARCHÉ ET LE POUVOIR: SOUVENIRS D’UN
COMMISSAIRE EUROPÉEN (Éditions Racine, 2000).
84. M. Monti, European Competition for the 21st Century, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L. J.
1602 (2000).
85. N. Kroes, Competition, the Crisis and the Road to Recovery, Address Before the
Economic Club of Toronto (Mar. 20, 2009).
86. Charlemagne, The Enforcer, THE ECONOMIST (May 2 2015) (noting her interest in
procedural openness as opposed to her predecessor’s preference for the use of commitment
decisions to resolve anticompetitive concerns).
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path when asked how far the interpretation of competition law should
be based exclusively on the welfare effects of restrictive practices.87
At the level of Advocates General, Nils Whal is perhaps even more
radical than AG Jacobs: in his Opinion in Cartes Bancaires he has
nearly succeeded in introducing a truncated rule of reason in Article
101, and the Court largely followed him;88 in Intel the approach he
suggested would steer enforcement along the lines the Commission
wishes. 89 Thus, the judicial pendulum may swing towards the
economic way suggested by the British.
B. Post-Brexit UK
A working group has been created to consider the impact of
Brexit on UK competition policy (the Brexit Competition Law
Working Group): it has published an issues paper in 2016 and has
received some written responses.90 The paper rightly notes that should
the UK join the EEA the result is relatively simple: little will change
save that the UK will lose a formal voice in the shaping of EU
competition policy. It then considers short term and long term matters
that should be discussed in case Brexit severs the links with the EU in
a more profound way.
Here we take a different tack than the practical one which the
members of the working group elected. There are two themes that can
be considered in gazing into the future of Britain when we listen to
the main claims in favor of leaving the EU: one is the wish to ‘take
back control’91 of national policies and the other may be reduced to
the phrase ‘global Britain’, the wish to see the UK open to trade with
one and all.92 Below we explore how far these two themes (taking
back control and global Britain) might play out in competition law.
87. Konkurrensverket v. TeliaSonera Sverige AB et al., Case C-52/09, [2011] E.C.R. I564, ¶¶ 20-22 (rejecting the demotion of competition law); see Chalmers, supra note 41, 10461050 for an assessment of recent case law, showing how some cases point towards a more
effects-based approach and others towards retaining the current framework.
88. Groupement des cartes bancaires (CB) v. Commission, C-67/13, 2014, http://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/SUM/?uri=CELEX:62013CJ0067.
89. Intel Corporation v. Commission, C-413/14 P, 2014, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/
celex.jsf?celex=62014CC0413&lang1=en&type=TXT&ancre=.
90. The issues paper and responses are available at www.bclwg.org.
91. A. Runswick, Just who is it taking back control with Brexit?, THE GUARDIAN (Mar.
30, 2017).
92. Seàn Molloy, Global Britain’: Theresa May’s Ersatz Vision, THE DISORDER OF
THING (Jan. 31, 2017), https://thedisorderofthings.com/2017/01/31/global-britain-theresamays-ersatz-vision/.
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1. Legal Links to the EU
Any person wishing for hard Brexit with the EU would, upon
reading sections 10 and 60 of the Competition Act 1998 immediately
see these sections as prime targets for deletion as they fly in the face
of domestic control. Section 60(1) of the Competition Act 1998 seeks
to ensure that questions arising in interpreting this Act ‘are dealt with
in a manner which is consistent with the treatment of corresponding
questions arising in Community law.’ Section 60(2) then imposes a
duty on the competition authority and national courts to ensure that
there is no inconsistency between British law and the principles laid
down by the European Court and any decision of that Court. And
section 60(3) provides that competition authorities and courts must
have regard to decisions and statements of the Commission. Clearly
this relinquishes far too much control, and whatever its impact has
been, it has to be repealed because it makes British judges subject to
EU institutions. Section 10 is equally offensive: section 10(1) codifies
the case law of the ECJ by which Commission decisions bind national
authorities and section 10(2) provides for a system of parallel
exemptions: if an agreement which does not affect trade between
member States would otherwise fall within the scope of a Block
Exemption Regulation then it is also exempted under the Competition
Act 1998.93
From the perspective of those wanting to take back control these
two sections clearly have to go. More generally, one might wonder if
the Euro-skeptics might take offence that the language of the two
prohibitions in the Act mirror Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. Thus one
might even argue that the scheme of the statute as a whole has to be
got rid of, even if hardly any of the provisions in the Competition Act
1998 are due to a requirement coming from EU Law. Moreover, some
think that the interpretation of competition rules remains far too
formalistic in the EU and that taking back control would allow the
UK to regulate markets with a more effective approach to cases.94
However, there is a tension with the other Brexit desiderata:
global Britain. One of the arguments the vast majority of competition

93. Competition Act 1998, c. 41 (Eng.) To be precise it is exempted from the Chapter 1
prohibition, which is the equivalent of Article 101 TFEU.
94 . John Vickers, The Economic Consequences of Brexit, OXFORD REVIEW OF
ECONOMIC POLICY (Dec. 7, 2016), http://www.bclwg.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/
Vickers-British-Academy-7-Dec-16.pdf.
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lawyers press is the importance of a convergent approach to the
interpretation of competition law.95 Imitating the EU is simply a way
to favor business wishing to operate across the European Economic
Area. As many others have pointed out in various fora, there is only
so much control one can have of national laws in a global economy.
Accordingly it may be prudent not to jettison much of the architecture
that links the UK to the EU, in order to safeguard the reasonable
expectations of businesses in the long term.96 Indeed, there are aspects
of the Government’s White Paper, which suggest that, at least in the
medium term post-Brexit much of the EU acquis will be simply
copied into domestic legislation to offer businesses a seamless
transition. Only in the longer term will revisions be considered.97
However, even in the long term it is not easy to see what major
changes could be brought to UK competition Law: as we have shown
above the UK has already been able to diverge slightly from the
approach favored by the EU in discrete instances. Is a more radical
agenda likely? At the present moment, it remains to be seen how far
the global Britain policy may be undermined by a policy to protect
domestic businesses. In the summer of 2016 Theresa May indicated
that takeovers of national firms would be subjected to tighter scrutiny:
“A proper industrial strategy wouldn’t automatically stop the sale of
British firms to foreign ones, but it should be capable of stepping in to
defend a sector that is as important as pharmaceuticals is to Britain.”98
It is not clear how far this statement (made while she was running for
the leadership of the party) will translate into policy.
2. Economic Links to the EU
As discussed above, for mergers that have an EU dimension, the
Commission has exclusive competence. For global deals the
95. See David J. Gerber, Comparative Law and Global Regulatory Convergence: The
Example of Competition Law, in PRACTICE AND THEORY IN COMPARATIVE LAW 120
(Maurice Adams and Jacob Bomhoff eds., 2012).
96. See Lord Steyn, Contract Law: Fulfilling the Reasonable Expectations of Honest
Men, 113 LQR 433, 439 (1997). This is also a recurring leitmotif used when explaining the
virtues of English contract law.
97. Department for Exiting the European Union, LEGISLATING FOR THE UNITED
KINGDOM’S WITHDRAWAL FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION, 2017, Cm. 9446, at 7. It is ironic
indeed that before EU law can be got rid of in the UK, the government proposes to transpose a
significant part of that law into domestic law, retaining thus the need to engage with
developments in EU legislation until such a time as the legislation is substituted.
98. Theresa May to back new investment vetting system, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2016).
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Commission and its US counterpart have established a framework for
cooperation that normally works very smoothly so that the two sides
agree on the reasons why a merger should be challenged and on the
remedies necessary to make sure that a merger does not harm
competition. 99 On occasion the discussion includes other major
jurisdictions. 100 Sir John Vickers (a member of the Brexit working
group) has indicated that ‘duplication of merger control will have
substantial costs both for businesses and the authorities. Given the
size and complexity of international mergers, the resource
implications for the CMA could be major.’101 One might imagine that
a bilateral agreement like that with the US would serve Britain well.
However, we would like to suggest a more radical solution: can the
UK not, most of the time, free ride on the Commission’s merger
decisions?
Consider this: at the moment, if a merger has an EU dimension
the Commission will look at the impact of the merger across the
relevant EU markets. If a Member State believes that the merger has a
specific effect in its jurisdiction it can ask the Commission that the
merger (or parts of that transaction) should be referred to that
authority.102 As things stand, there have only been 112 requests for
referral out of over 6000 mergers notified.103 It suggests that for most
transactions with an EU dimension, Commission scrutiny will likely
protect the UK market too. Thus, a different modality of cooperation
could be explored that allows the UK to intervene in mergers that
affect the UK when the national authority it is not convinced that the
global solution likely to emerge from the Commission is unsuitable
for its market. This would comport fewer resources than vetting all
mergers that have an EU dimension. One might wonder whether a
similar approach might be implemented also for the purposes of
restrictive practices: this would not oblige the CMA to agree with the
99.
Decision of the Council and the Commission of 10 April 1995 concerning the
conclusion of the Agreement between the European Communities and the Government of the
United States of America regarding the application of their competition laws, O.J. (L 95) 38.
100.
See e.g. OECD, Working Party No. 3 on Co-operation and Enforcement:
Remedies in Cross-Border Merger Cases (Oct. 29, 2013), http://www.oecd.org/
officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?
cote=DAF/COMP/WP3(2013)6&docLanguage=En.
101.
Vickers, supra note 94, at 5.
102.
Council Regulation 139/04/EC on the control of concentrations between
undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation), 2004 O.J. L 24/1, art. 9.
103.
See European Commission Statistics, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/sta
tistics.pdf.
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conclusions of the Commission, but it would allow it to depart from
those instances where it considers that the Commission’s approach is
not addressing relevant market failures. This system is likely to be
cumbersome but it may serve to avoid the CMA’s scarce resources
being deployed to duplicate all actions taken by the Commission.
V. CONCLUSION
The British influence suggested in this chapter is perhaps
predictable: the British pushed for an approach to competition law
that is based on testing the economic effects of the commercial
activities under scrutiny, and favored freer markets. In pursuing these
lines, they challenged the view that restrictions to competition were to
be found when conduct harmed the competitive process simpliciter,
and they challenged the state’s role in the provision of utilities. This is
what one might have expected even without being an expert in
competition law.
These effects began to make themselves felt from the late 1980s.
Revolutionary then, they are now embedded in the EU’s system. As
suggested above, it was with the internal market project that the
British managed to insinuate a free market based regulatory approach
within the EU more generally and the economic transitions occurring
then facilitated a push towards a vision of competition law that we
find ordinary today: a technocratic venture to safeguard economic
welfare. That this approach has now become mainstream is probably
due less to the influence of the British, however, than on factors that
facilitated a particular vision of antitrust since that time.
In large part, this vision became the global standard as a result of
epistemic communities that are not based on nationality but are
clusters based on expertise and a shared vision for antitrust,104 like the
regulars at annual events like the Fordham Competition Law
Institute’s September conference, or at the European University
Institute’s annual competition workshops in June.105

104. See Frans van Waarden & Michaela Drahos, Courts and (epistemic) communities
in the convergence of competition policies, 9 J. OF EUR. PUB. POL’Y 913, 914 (2002)
(considering the Europeanisation of German, Austrian and Dutch competition law).
105. Jean-Francois Bellis, After Forty Years: The development of European Competition
Law – Views from Fordham, 2014 FORDHAM COMP. L. INST. 545 (2014); John Temple Lang,
After Forty Years: The Development of European Competition Law – Views from Fordham,
2014 FORDHAM COMP. L. INST. 555 (2014).
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The above suggests that what we have referred to as the
“British” vision of competition law is likely to continue to influence
the way the Commission operates even post-Brexit.106 However the
future of competition law in the UK is much less certain as
policymakers will have to navigate the difficult path between taking
back control and re-establishing a global presence for Britain in the
world.

106. See Jean-Francoise Verstrynge, Current Antitrust Policy Issues in the EEC: Some
Reflections on the Second Generation of Competition Policy, 1984 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST.
673, 681 (1984). Indeed, one can even find traces of the more economic approach in the early
1980s. The author was a member of the cabinet of Frans Andriessen (who served as
competition commissioner between 1981 and 1985) and noted that already by then the
Commission was using more economics to assess restrictive practices.
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